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 Abstract 
This paper looks at the European integration project in its current iteration drawing on Karl Polanyi’s 
assertion that markets are inseparable from the socio-cultural context. In this regard, all attempts to 
liberalise the economy (not excluding European integration, which is based on the principle of the 
single market) have practical and indeed tangible political ramifications. The main hypothesis of the 
paper lies in the recognition of the fact that the neoliberal agenda is one of the defining features of 
European integration. It is after all, the project of the single market, with its free movement of goods, 
services, capital, and labour that underpins European Union integrative practice.  
Secondly, it is the presupposition of this paper, that there is a certain degree of congruence between 
the economic elites, operating within the neoliberal framework, and the centre-left political elites. The 
argument here is that the logic of neoliberalism has been fundamentally accepted across the 
mainstream of the political spectrum. This consequently means that even left-wing parties have had 
to reposition themselves both ideologically and practically, which brings the conclusion that the 
market has lost its role as the basic ideological differentiator between the traditional right and left. 
The axis of political debate has consequently shifted to moral issues such as the relationship between 
the state and the church, immigration, and gender. 
Keywords: EU; neoliberalism; democracy deficit; political ideologies 
Introduction 
On 12th October, 2016 Euractiv.com reported on a peculiar piece of news. According 
to one of the biggest European media platforms, more than 150,000 European Union 
(EU) officials and citizens had signed a petition demanding that the pension rights of 
former European Commission President José Manuel Barroso should be suspended 
for accepting a job at Goldman Sachs (Euractiv, 2016). According to the petition by EU 
staff: “This decision to go and work for one of the banks most implicated in the 
subprime crisis that led to the financial crisis of 2007-2008 – the worst since the Great 
Depression – as well as one of the banks most involved in the Greek debt crisis, having 
helped Greece dissimulate its deficit before speculating in 2009-2010 against it in full 
knowledge of the unsustainability of its debt, is a further example of the irresponsible 
revolving-door practices, which are highly damaging to the EU institutions and, even 
if not illegal, morally reprehensible” (change.org).  
Admittedly, this is not the only case that has stirred controversies regarding the ethics 
both of former and current high-ranking officials of the European Commission. The 
Alliance for Lobby Transparency and Ethics Regulation (ALTER-EU) lodged a formal 





so-called “revolving door” phenomenon – the movement of personnel between roles 
as legislators and regulators and the industries affected by the legislation and 
regulation. Apparently, the European Commission did not act when Ms Neelie Kroes 
(a former European Commissioner for Digital Agenda and a European Commissioner 
for Competition) joined the public policy advisory board of Uber (an American 
worldwide online transportation network company) and the board of directors of 
Salesforce (an American loud computing company). The European Commission also 
did not act when the former Trade Commissioner Mr De Gucht joined the board of 
Arcelor Mittal (a Luxembourg-based multinational steel manufacturing corporation, 
and a major EU lobbyist). Furthermore, ALTER-EU claims that these three cases prove 
not only the vagueness of the Code of Conduct for the Commissioners and the 
inadequate implementation of Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, but also demonstrate a failure on the part of the Commission to even 
recognise the problem (Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation, 
2016). Consequently, ALTER-EU proposes a reform of the “revolving door” rules in the 
existing Code of Conduct; this reform needs to extend the cooling-off periods for 
former Commissioners and provide a better definition of lobbying as well as revise the 
appointment procedures to an ad hoc ethical committee. 
Whether or not these cases are isolated, they are highly controversial since they include 
the highest-ranking officials of the regulating body of the EU. Amid recent calls from 
France and Germany to deepen the project of European integration and move towards 
a federation, it is vital to analyse and once again question the normative basis of 
European integration in the economic domain. It seems that the mainstream of the 
European civil service and most national political elites have accepted the 
phenomenon of globalisation with all its economic and political consequences as being 
the only viable solution. In other words, the existing European establishment is either 
not capable or not willing to propose alternative solutions that would aim to tackle the 
economic and social challenges.  
This paper looks at the European integration project in its current iteration, drawing 
on Karl Polanyi’s assertion that markets are inseparable from the socio-cultural 
context. In this regard, all attempts to liberalize the economy (not excluding European 
integration, which is based on the principle of the single market) have practical and 
indeed tangible political ramifications. The main hypothesis of this paper lies in 
recognizing the fact that the neoliberal agenda is one of the defining features of 
European integration. It is, after all, the project of the single market with its free 
movement of goods, services, capital, and labour that underpins EU integrative 
practice. Secondly, it is the presupposition of this paper that there is a certain degree 
of congruence between the economic elites, operating within the neoliberal framework, 
and the centre-left political elites. The major question that this paper addresses is the 
consequences of the suggested ideological shift by the mainstream European political 
elites for the European societies and in particular for the European identity and the 
future of the EU. 
Neoliberalism is referred to herein as an ideology which denotes a concept of freedom 
as an overarching social value associated with reducing the state’s functions to those 
of a minimal state. Furthermore, terms such as: “neoliberal paradigm” and “neoliberal 
agenda” or “neoliberal perspective” are used to denote different aspects of the very 
same ideology. Two more notions are used throughout the paper: “economic elites” 
and “Political elites”. Both are used in a narrow sense. The term “political elites” is 
Sliwinski, ANZJES 10(1) 
 
94 
applied in a strictly formal manner and refers to political parties and their 
representatives in power. As for the term “economic elites” it refers to the whole 
amalgam of economic actors that are capable of influencing (lobbing) the decision-
making process both on national as well as European levels. 
The first segment of the paper analyses the ideological grounds of European 
integration from the liberal perspective. In doing so, it draws upon both the regional 
European determinants and the larger international circumstances that have led to the 
international liberalisation of trade. To facilitate the argumentation, examples of 
influence by big business and lobbying are invoked. Given the limited nature of this 
paper the above mentioned illustrations do not and in fact cannot pretend to represent 
the whole picture. Yet, they have been applied here as important cases that are capable 
of confirming a hypothesis which claims that neoliberalism is one of the defining 
features of European integration – the emphasis being on one of, not the prevailing 
one or the exclusive one. It is understood thus that the processes of European 
integration are multifaceted and therefore bear many, sometimes even contradictory 
characteristics. The focus of this study is revolving around the role of the market forces 
in European integration and the consequences of such for European politics at large as 
well as European societies. 
Next, special attention is paid to the context regarding the negotiations of the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The major line of the 
argument is that these agreements, controversial in their content but more importantly 
due to the secrecy surrounding the negotiation process, should raise serious concerns 
regarding the EU citizenship capacity.  
Last but not least, the example of the Eurozone is employed in order to strengthen the 
argumentation, which based on the criticism of neoliberalism, helps the reader in 
understanding not only the fallacy of the single currency concept, but more 
importantly in making a link with the political accountability and democratic 
challenges. The following segments of the paper, while revolving around the issue of 
democratic representation, focus on the shift in political ideologies between the major 
European political parties. The argument here is that the logic of neoliberalism has 
been fundamentally accepted across the mainstream of the political spectrum. As a 
result, even left-wing parties have had to reposition themselves both ideologically and 
practically, which brings the conclusion that the market has lost its role as the basic 
ideological differentiator between the traditional right and left. The axis of political 
debate has consequently shifted to moral issues such as the relationship between the 
state and the church, immigration, and gender. This, has far reaching consequences 
for “European identity”. 
Neoliberalism and the project of European integration 
The end of the Cold War facilitated the speeding-up of the processes of globalisation, 
especially in its economic domain. The so-called “Washington Consensus” (WC), a set 
of policy recommendations which aimed to deregulate finance and trade, became the 
new global standard. The peace dividend, heralded after the end of the Cold War, 
allowed for a market-based approach to dominate numerous aspects of politics and 
also international relations. No more competition, “let’s talk business”, became the 
new modus operandi. Neoliberalism therefore entered its next stage where economics 





character of neoliberal authority: on what basis does the neoliberal state demand the 
right to be obeyed, if not on substantive political grounds? To a large extent, it is on the 
basis of particular economic claims and rationalities, constructed and propagated by 
economic experts. The state does not necessarily (or at least, not always) cede power 
to markets, but comes to justify its decisions, policies and rules in terms that are 
commensurable with the logic of markets.” What it means in practice for foreign 
policy-makers in the 21st century is that ideological differences are no longer barriers 
to trade and therefore pragmatism becomes not only an overwhelming narrative but 
can even be elevated to the level of a normative basis.  
The history of European integration starts with a project carried out under the banner 
of functionalism. The first community – the European Coal and Steel Community – 
was to a large extent also an economic project that would allow the foundations to be 
laid for the future creation of a free trade area and a common market (Nugent, 2010). 
The subsequent creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) firmly 
established economic cooperation based on the liberalisation of the markets. As Article 
2 of the EEC treaty (the treaty which established the EEC in 1957) clearly stated: “the 
community shall have as its task, establishing a common market and progressively 
approximating the economic policies of member states, to promote throughout the 
community a harmonious development of economic activities, the continuous and 
balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of 
living and close relations states belonging to it”. Article 3 further elaborates on the 
practical steps to be taken in order to achieve the stated goals. These steps, among 
others, included: the elimination of customs duties and quantitative restrictions; the 
establishment of a common customs tariff; the abolition of obstacles to the free 
movement of persons, services, and capital; the inauguration of a common agricultural 
policy; the inauguration of a common transport policy; the establishment of a 
competition policy; and the establishment of procedures to tackle the imbalance of 
payments between Member States. The preamble of the treaty explicitly states, inter 
alia, that the EEC falls within the general logic of the progressive abolition of 
restrictions on international trade. 
Let us keep in mind that the years 1955 and 1956 saw the fourth round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the so-called Geneva Round, where 26 countries 
participated and US$2.5 billion in tariffs were eliminated or reduced. Subsequent 
rounds, which included more countries and pushed the reductions further, created the 
general framework in the global scope for the liberalisation of trade. It was obvious to 
the Europeans, from the early years onwards, that amid a globalizing world they had 
to pool their economic resources to stay competitive. Especially painful was the 
realisation of the economic cooperation limitations within the EEC vis-à-vis the oil 
shock of 1973 as well as the end of the Bretton Woods system, which brought currency 
vulnerabilities. These events are usually referred to in the literature as the 
“Eurosclerosis of the 1970s” and they brought to the forefront the need to deepen 
economic cooperation and prepare the ground for monetary cooperation (Staab, 2011). 
The 1980s made it clear that deepening cooperation between the European markets 
was the only way to remain competitive in an international economy, given Japanese 
and American economic growth. The world has in that sense become only more 
competitive since then. The EU bureaucracy has recently confirmed the apparently 
unavoidable trends of such nature in its latest, as of July 2017, document regarding the 
future of the EU. “The White Paper on the future of Europe: avenues for unity for the 
EU at 27”, as announced by President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude 
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Juncker, identifies the processes of globalisation and economic competitiveness as one 
of the underlying and indeed fundamental factors that are shaping the international 
environment. Let us take a closer look at the document, which still remains the official 
stance of many of the EU political elites on the challenges Europe is expected to face 
by 2025.   
In its second part entitled: The drivers of Europe’s future – a changing place in an 
evolving world, the opening salvo takes the reader right into the middle of the 
economy-related arguments: “Europe is home to the world’s largest single market and 
second most used currency. It is the largest trade power and development and 
humanitarian aid donor. […] While the world has never been smaller or better 
connected, the return of isolationism has cast doubts over the future of international 
trade and multilateralism. Europe’s prosperity and ability to uphold our values on the 
world stage will continue to depend on its openness and strong links with its partners. 
Yet, standing up for free and progressive trade and shaping globalisation so it benefits 
all will be a growing challenge. […] The White Paper looks at how Europe will change 
in the next decade, from the impact of new technologies on society and jobs, to doubts 
about globalisation, security concerns and the rise of populism. It spells out the choice 
we face: being swept along by those trends, or embracing them and seizing the new 
opportunities they bring. Europe’s population and economic weight [is] falling as other 
parts of the world grow. By 2060, none of our Member States will account for even 1% 
of the world’s population – a compelling reason for sticking together to achieve more.” 
(White Paper on the future of Europe: Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025).  
The document puts forward five possible scenarios for EU Member States to follow: (a) 
“Carrying On” – where the EU27 focuses on delivering its positive reform agenda in the 
spirit of the Commission’s New Start for Europe from 2014 and of the Bratislava 
Declaration agreed by all 27 Member States in 2016; (b) “Nothing but the Single 
Market” – where the EU27 is gradually re-centred on the single market as the 27 
Member States are not able to find common ground on an increasing number of policy 
areas; (c) “Those Who Want More Do More” – where the EU27 proceeds as today but 
allows willing Member States to do more together in specific areas such as defence, 
internal security, or social matters. Consequently, one or several “coalitions of the 
willing” emerge; (d) “Doing Less More Efficiently” – where the EU27 focuses on 
delivering more and faster in selected policy areas, while doing less where it is 
perceived not to have an added value. Accordingly, attention and limited resources are 
focused on selected policy areas; and (e) “Doing Much More Together” – where, 
Member States decide to share more power, resources, and decision-making across the 
board. Decisions are agreed faster at the European level and are thereafter rapidly 
enforced.  
Given President Juncker’s role, his political affiliations and numerous earlier speeches, 
observers are probably right to assume that the most favoured scenario would be 
scenario number five, also referred to as the “Verhofstadt scenario” (named after the 
MEP and former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, a leading proponent of 
federalism). Cooperation between Member States would, according to this option, go 
further than ever before in all domains (Politico, 2017). As Bartholomeusz observes, 
“[…] it is clear from the tone of the White Paper where the institution’s sympathies lie. 
In these matters, Juncker and his team are absolutely right: only federal integration 





possibilities? Because they will both, sooner or later, lead to the collapse of the EU 
itself” (Bartholomeusz, 2017). 
Likewise, Guy Verhofstadt himself has recently proposed that the European 
Commission should be abolished. In its place should be created a small European 
government (Die Zeit, 2017). In his own words: “WE CANNOT CONTINUE to stand 
separately and muddle along like this while globalisation mercilessly batters our 
member states’ national sovereignty. Whether in relation to the banking crisis, global 
warming, international fraud, or organised crime, anyone seeking an effective solution 
to these issues inevitably concludes that one exists only at the European level. Thus we 
must opt for stronger European institutions and a federal European state. 
In fact, globalisation necessitates the advent of this sort of federal Europe. And 
globalisation is only going to gather speed […] As a consequence of the world we live 
in, integrating is no longer an option; it is a necessity” (Verhofstadt, 2017).  
Big business and influential individuals 
One of the most interesting examples of how big business influences European politics 
is the Brussels Economic Forum (BEF). It is, as one can read on the official website of 
European Commission, a flagship annual economic event. The BEF brings together top 
European and international policy-makers and opinion leaders as well as civil society 
and business leaders. It is the forum at which to take stock of economic developments, 
identify key challenges, and debate policy priorities. The BEF attracts a thousand 
participants every year and broad media coverage, and it provides a major networking 
opportunity (European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, 2017). One of 
the key speakers during its latest session (1st June, 2017) was George Soros – founder 
and Chair of Soros Fund Management LLC and the Open Society Foundations. In his 
speech delivered at the BEF, Soros identified three problem areas where he urged 
European policy-makers to achieve what he termed “a meaningful progress”. These 
areas include: the immigration crisis; territorial disintegration (Brexit); and the lack of 
an economic growth policy (Remarks at the Brussels Economic Forum, 2017). As such, 
the document seems objective and even constructive.  
One should, however, bear in mind that, apart from being a successful funds manager, 
Soros has been involved in bringing down both the British Pound in 1992 and the Thai 
Bhat in 1997 (which latter act allegedly led to Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 (Business 
Insider, 2016)), and he is a strong supporter of massive immigration from North Africa 
and the Middle East to Europe. In the middle of 2015, amid the beginning of the 
immigration wave that has reached Europe, Project Syndicate published an article, in 
which Soros proposed a six-point plan that in its last point postulated: “First, the EU 
has to accept at least a million asylum-seekers annually for the foreseeable future. And, 
to do that, it must share the burden fairly […] Adequate financing is critical. The EU 
should provide €15,000 (US$16,800) per asylum-seeker for each of the first two years 
to help cover housing, health care, and education costs – and to make accepting 
refugees more appealing to member states (author, 2016). 
Arguably, George Soros promotes a particular version of a borderless society that fuses 
progressive social ideas supported by the European left and economic conditions that 
draw heavily on the ideology of neoliberalism. His foundations, or the institutions that 
they support more or less openly, are in fact parties to ideological and political conflicts 
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in countries such as the USA, Russia or even China. Interestingly, in the case of 
Hungary or Poland, unlike the way in which the mainstream so-called liberal media 
like to present it, Soros is able to influence public discourse overtly or covertly 
supporting the political opposition against legally elected governments, supported by 
the majority of voters, that happen to emphasise national interests – the case of the 
Central European University in Hungary or the daily Gazeta Wyborcza (Electoral 
Newspaper) in Poland. The latter is in fact an exemplar of a reactionary, post-
communist platform, through which all sorts of “modern”, “European” or even 
“international” arguments are cynically and instrumentally used against the 
government of Law and Justice in the ideological battle between the former left on the 
one hand and centre-right and the right on the other. 
Eurozone challenges 
Perhaps the most tangible symbol of European economic integration, as well as of the 
economic crisis, is the European single currency – the Euro. Historically speaking, a 
single currency had been on the minds of the European political elites for quite some 
time. Not surprisingly, arguments in favour of the creation of monetary union were 
largely, economically speaking at least, based on the liberal agenda: “a single currency 
offers advantages, such as eliminating fluctuating exchange rates and exchange costs. 
As it is easier for companies to conduct cross-border trade and the economy is more 
stable, the economy grows and consumers have more choice. A common currency also 
encourages people to travel and shop in other countries. At global level, the euro gives 
the EU more clout, as it is the second most important international currency after the 
US dollar” (europa.eu). 
Eighteen years after the creation of the Eurozone (on 1st January, 1999), the single 
currency is still far from delivering its promised benefits. Huge inequalities within the 
Eurozone itself, high unemployment (especially among the young), the loss of job 
security, the consequent emergence of a new social class (the “precariat”), very low 
inflation, and economic stagnation or minimal growth are trademarks of the general 
economic problems in the EU, and they are even worse in the Eurozone countries. As 
Joseph Stiglitz suggests: “In a sense, then, the story of the Eurozone is a morality play: 
It illustrates how leaders out of touch with their electorates can design systems that do 
not serve their citizens well (Stiglitz, 2016). There is no doubt here that one of the 
greatest economists of our time is not only heavily criticizing the foundations of the 
monetary union, but he also defines the ideology of neoliberalism as the single most 
important nonmaterial factor that has led to the biggest economic crisis of the 21st 
century to date, which as we have seen has had dire consequences for the Euro and the 
EU economies. 
Paul De Grauwe of the London School of Economics echoes this position. In a widely 
cited paper on the design of the Eurozone, he says: “[…] the endogenous dynamics of 
booms and busts that are endemic in capitalism continued to work at the national level 
in the Eurozone and that the monetary union in no way disciplined these into a union-
wide dynamics. On the contrary the monetary union probably exacerbated these 
national booms and busts” (De Grauwe, 2013). 
Economic problems coupled with a growing wealth gap have prompted many to 
question the normative basis on which the EU project has until recently been carried 





As Michael Rustin of Soundings rightly observes: “The fact is that the principles of the 
free movement of labour and capital, which have been quite central to the idea of the 
European Union, represent the implementation on a European scale of the doctrines 
of neoliberalism. These principles are, and always have been, quite insufficient for the 
regulation of capitalism in democratic societies”. 
Lobbying 
For years, lobbying has been an important part of European policy-making. Recently, 
with the Lisbon Treaty, lobbying has been institutionalised in the EU. It is officially 
termed “European interest representation” and is made part of the legislative process 
under the framework of the new participatory democracy of the EU. 
According to the UK-based ALTER-EU (a coalition of over 200 public interest groups 
and trade unions) between 25,000 and 30,000 professional lobbyists at any time 
populate the corridors of the EU institutions. Allegedly, a large majority represent 
business interests. The ALTER-EU claims that the influence of corporate lobbyists on 
EU policy-making has largely remained out of public sight, and therefore the influence 
granted to corporate lobbyists in EU decision-making stirs serious concerns about the 
impartiality of EU decision-making and its democratic principle (Alliance for Lobbying 
Transparency, 2017). 
Furthermore, the Brussels-based Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), a non-profit 
research and campaign group, which campaigns for transparency in European 
corporate lobbying, publishes regular information on the environment, economy and 
finance, food and agriculture, international trade, and the “revolving doors” 
phenomenon. Their “revolving door watch” makes important reading for all those who 
are interested in what the commissioners, members of the European Parliament, and 
other EU officials do when they stop working for the EU institutions (Corporate Europe 
Observatory, 2017). For example, according its website, in a vital for social Europe 
domain – healthcare, privatisation has been ready across Europe’s health services 
(Tansey, 2017). Marketisation, trade policy, public–private partnership, and 
“economic governance” are all culprits of the incremental encroachment of an 
increasingly privatised model of healthcare provision across Europe.  
Alarmingly, as we can learn from LobbyFacts.eu: “The private sector has more 
organisations lobbying the EU, spends more on lobbying, and deploys more lobbyists 
than NGOs and trade unions. In the Parliament, the analysis of the number of lobbyists 
shows that the corporate sector has 60 per cent more than that of civil society. If you 
factor in lobby consultancies, the imbalance becomes even more stark” (Cann, 2017). 
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CETA – the democracy deficit  
On 30th October 2016, the day on which CETA was finally signed, Guy Verhofstadt 
declared on his Facebook account: “I am happy that European and Canadian leaders 
formally signed their EU-Canada free trade pact today. In times of increasing 
globalisation, a retreat to protectionism will make us poorer. We should use 
agreements like #CETA to set the framework and rules for global connectivity 
ourselves.”1 The then President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz and the 
President of the European Commission have been also openly enthusiastic, indicating 
the new “benchmark” in EU–Canada relations as well as the “golden standard” in 
international trade agreements.2 The President of the European Council Donald Tusk 
went even further, declaring on his Twitter account: “Free trade and globalisation 
have protected humanity from poverty, hunger and total conflict. Few people seems 
[sic] to believe this today.””3 
The list of counterarguments against CETA is lengthy. The many opponents of the 
CETA between the EU and Canada prominently feature The Greens–European Free 
Alliance in the European Parliament (Greens/EFA), who resolutely oppose CETA 
for twelve reasons. These reasons are not only fundamentally important from the 
procedural standpoint but they principally refer to the content of the agreement. 
According to The Greens, unlike in the case of TTIP, during the CETA negotiations 
the European Commission never released the documents before the final text of the 
agreement was published (The Greens/European Free Alliance, 2017). The 
European Parliament members and parliamentarians across Europe alike could not 
therefore have access to the text while it was being negotiated, thereby depriving 
European societies of their basic right to scrutinise the policy-making process.4 
Furthermore, the Green/EFA claims that, particularly worrying, are those 
stipulations which provide for investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS), which allows 
foreign investors to sue nations if they feel that their businesses have been impacted 
by new laws or regulations.5 Other concerns include: locking-in current and further 
liberalisation, thereby making it very difficult (and costly) for countries to bring 
services back into public ownership; increased costs to public healthcare systems due 
to changes in patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs; further contribution to the 
pro-GMO (genetically modified organisms) pressure on the EU regulatory processes; 
weakening the Fuel Quality Directive (FQD), which is allegedly a crucial piece of law 
aimed at reducing the EU’s carbon emissions; weakening the rules which aim to benefit 
local communities and municipalities in terms of employment and sustainability; 
procuring the facilitation of only the “most beneficial” or “the cheapest offer” 
mechanisms when tendering; providing no binding rules to protect and improve 
workers’ rights and environmental protection; introducing further completion 
mechanism which will probably affect farmers; containing pro-industry provisions 
                                                        
1 See: https://www.facebook.com/GuyVerhofstadt/  
2 See: https://twitter.com/JunckerEU  
3 See: https://twitter.com/eucopresident  
4 See: Aline Robert (13th October, 2016).”Strange” maneuvering over CETA exposes democratic deficit. Euractiv 
Retrieved from http://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/strange-maneuvering-over-ceta-exposes-
democratic-deficit/  
5 This is a particularly controversial mechanism. For more information and analysis please see: Michael Geist, The 









which curb the regulatory space for governments to act with regard to the Paris 
Agreement provision limiting CO2 emissions; and, finally, expanding foreign investor-
rights tenfold, which may result in 81% of US subsidiaries in the EU being able to 
launch ISDS attacks with CETA alone. 
Interestingly, concern is growing among Canadians as well. As Citizens Against CETA 
(a Canadian-based citizen action group) claim, the Canadian government continues to 
maintain that CETA will boost Canada’s economy by 12 billion Canadian Dollars and 
create 80,000 jobs (Citizens Against CETA, 2017). These figures were apparently 
generated by manipulating the results of a 2008 computer model built by three 
European economists retained by the Canadian and the EU governments. As such, it is 
claimed that it has serious flaws: it assumes full employment; total reinvestment of 
trade gains into new production; balanced trade; and Canadian corporations doing as 
well in Europe as European corporations are doing in Canada. It does not take into 
consideration the impact of currency fluctuations and also it predates the economic 
crash of 2008 (Economic prosperity based on a flawed computer model, 2013). 
The shift of paradigms 
Now that we have established the empirical evidence that indicates the fundamental 
link between the liberal paradigm and the European integration processes, let us turn 
our attention to European politics and specifically to the European political parties 
both at the national and the European levels. As put forward before, the major 
presumption of this paper is that the traditional divide between the left and the right, 
which stems from the attitudes towards the role of the state in managing the markets, 
is no longer relevant in understanding contemporary European politics. Today, most 
mainstream political parties, both those on the right and those on the left, have 
fundamentally accepted the free-market paradigm and therefore the processes of 
globalisation. As Martin Schulz, the then president of the European Parliament, 
observed when commenting on CETA: “CETA is a good agreement. Globalisation needs 
rules, […] “If there is an error we can make today is not to vote for CETA, […] The 
government in Sweden (left supported by the greens), the government in Lisbon 
(supported by the left wing and communist party), the governments in Italy, France, 
Austria, Slovakia, Czech Republic – all socialist parties are in favour, […] “These are 
left wing leaders in Europe. We are in favour for it.” (Euraciv, 2017). 
This requires a further look into the European left-wing political parties’ platforms and 
an analysis of their evolution since the 1980s. Traditionally, leftists [...] claim that 
human development flourishes when individuals engage in cooperative, mutually 
respectful relations that can thrive only when excessive differences in status, power, 
and wealth are eliminated. According to the leftists, a society without substantial 
equality will distort the development not only of deprived persons, but also of those 
whose privileges undermine their motivation and sense of social responsibility. This 
suppression of human development, together with the resentment and conflict 
engendered by sharp class distinctions, will ultimately reduce the efficiency of the 
economy (Clark, 1998). From the traditional left (socialist) concern for the weak and 
vulnerable in society (welfare concern, redistribution, and social justice), influenced by 
a Keynesian-based stance that capitalism could be “humanised” (beliefs especially 
adhered to after the Second World War (WWII), social democrats have evolved greatly; 
they had in fact already abandoned many of their original values by the 1980s. The so-
called “third way” has been one of the major features of this evolution. Although 
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notoriously imprecise and subject to various interpretations, it is characterised by four 
prominent attributes: (a) top-down state intervention is a dead-end, and consequently 
there is no alternative to “a dynamic market economy”; (b) acceptance of the processes 
of globalisation as a major economic and social force in the contemporary world; (c) a 
shift in the role of the government to promote the competitiveness of society through 
education and the strengthening of civil society, and finally, (d) the abandonment of 
socialist egalitarianism, and, instead, the embracing of the liberal ideas of equality of 
opportunity and meritocracy (Heywood, 2002). 
Accordingly, as Tom Angier in Social Europe argues: “[…] we face a problem of great 
historical moment: namely the European left’s abandonment of its core constituency. 
Since the 1980s, the working classes have been progressively deprived of a political 
voice, a situation exacerbated by the increasing ‘immiseration’ of those still clinging to 
the label ‘middle class’. In the face of such downward mobility, those who might have 
stood up to the emerging status quo have engaged, instead, in a full-scale retreat. And 
this has taken place on two main fronts” (Angier, 2015). Firstly, therefore, we witness 
the construction of the “new left” on the social front which, appealing mainly to the 
urban middle class, emphasises the fight against all kinds of “prejudice”, 
“discrimination”, “intolerance”, “bigotry”, and “ethnocentrism”. This results in social 
campaigns for LGBTQ rights, environmentalism, abortion, euthanasia, and a pro-
immigration stance. Such “progressiveness” logically results in its detachment from 
large sections of societies that have to strive to survive in the ever-growing pressures 
of a competitive world. At the same time, the state is looked to as a vade mecum for all 
kinds of social ills, as in the case of Sweden or Germany, where, instead of trade unions, 
church schools, mutual societies, and cooperatives, it is now the government and its 
departments that are to act as the “universal” parent. 
Secondly, on the economic front the left has been notoriously slow, indeed entirely 
ineffective in addressing the threats presented by the ever-growing power of 
multinational companies and supranational institutions such as the World Trade 
Organisation, the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, or the 
European Commission. 
The liberal ideology, on the other hand, has been enjoying a steady rise in its influence 
on socio-economic systems across the globe from the late 1970s (including the time of 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan) until the first decade of the 21st century. As an 
ideology, neoliberalism posits the withdrawal of the state from many of its basic 
functions (economy, public services, education, healthcare, housing, etc.) and the 
consequent faith that the hidden hand of the market will almost always regulate the 
provision of services in a more efficient manner. Neoliberals (neoconservatives, 
monetarists or the “WC” supporters) derive their unabashed criticism of the state and 
its role in society by drawing on Ludwig von Mises’s and Friedrich Hayek’s arguments 
which revolve around individual freedoms, especially those in the political realm. The 
major argument, as put forward by Hayek, being that: “The authority directing all 
economic activity would control not merely the part of our lives which is concerned 
with inferior things; it would control the allocation of the limited means for all our 
ends [emphasis by the author]. And whoever controls all economic activity controls the 
means for all our ends [emphasis by the author], and must therefore decide which are 
to be satisfied and which not. This is really the crux of the matter. Economic control is 
not merely control of a sector of human life which can be separated from the rest; it is 





Consequently, an argument has been put forward by both the Austrian School (Carl 
Menger, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, and Friedrich von Wieser) and the Chicago School 
(Milton Friedman, George Stigler, Ronald Coase, and Gary Becker) which proposes 
that the role of the state should be as small as possible. This appears to be one of the 
major areas of the lib-left alliance, and is what one might refer to as a “congruence of 
interests”. This, however, seems to be contradictory once we recall the shift of values 
among the left-wing parties. The left with their progressive ideas, in the radical Marxist 
and revolutionary tradition, have been against the national state by definition. In a 
milder, social-democratic tradition it has been against the control over the individuals 
as exercised by traditional institutions such as the church, the family, or gender. In 
effect, contemporary liberals and left-wing ideologues strive for the same ends – the 
liberation of an individual from the traditional norms imposed by traditional 
institutions. This alliance is, however, of a tactical character, and to a large extent it 
can be characterised by its negative nature: tactical, in the sense that in the final 
analysis, the ends of the left are very different from those pursued by the neoliberals; 
negative, in the sense that both ideologies see nationalism, political sovereignty, and 
traditional values as major threats in the way of creating new, postmodern societies.  
One needs to look no further than what has been discussed above, namely, CETA. On 
15th February, 2017, after eight years of negotiations, the European Parliament finally 
voted by a large margin in favour of the agreement: 408 in support of CETA vs. 254 
against, with 33 abstentions (European Parliament, 2017). Interestingly, the socialists 
were particularly in favour of the agreement: 174 socialists voted in support vs. 66 
against (importantly, and against the instructions of their party group), with 13 
abstentions (Euractiv, 2017) 
The opening salvo of the S&D position paper on globalisation also leaves no doubts as 
to the alliance’s take on the processes of globalisation: “Definitions of what 
Globalisation is vary immensely. Nevertheless, no matter how we define it, we must all 
acknowledge that Globalisation is now not only a process; it is a fact of life for citizens, 
workers, companies and countries alike. Drivers of globalisation such as enhanced 
trade, investment and disruptive technological change is [sic] impacting all parts of our 
lives and people all over the globe. Since all are impacted by it; all must come to benefit 
from it. That is the task we set for Europe in Harnessing Globalization” (Socialists & 
Democrats in the European Parliament, 2017). 
On top of this, one should keep in mind that according to Euractiv France, “barely a 
dozen sectoral agreements have been finalised since social dialog was established in 
Europe (enshrined in the Treaty Establishing European Community – author’s 
comment). The social partners’ contradictory objectives and the progressive 
disinvestment of the European Commission are to blame for this (Eractiv France, 
2018).   
Clash of values and the integrative project in Europe 
Given the origins of European integration as well as the prominent position of 
socialists nowadays against the backdrop of the above-mentioned shift of the left-wing 
paradigm, one should query the axiological clash of values, which, in the assertion of 
the author of this paper, is leading directly to the crisis in European identity. 
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This clash of values is seen in two realms: firstly, in the realm of religious influence, 
particularly the Christian norms established during the past millennium; and, secondly 
and consequently, in the economic realm where the two visions of capitalism (a 
neoliberal one and a regulated one) have been in collision since the late 1970s.   
At first, European integration was a project very much based on Christian values (a 
sense of community and a common European identity). The founding fathers of 
European integration such as Alcide De Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer, and Robert 
Schuman 6  were not only Catholics themselves but leaders of respective national 
political parties, commonly termed Christian Democratic (Linda, 2010). In this 
respect, the European Christian democratic parties supported the integration of 
Western Europe as a means of rebuilding the economies of their countries in the 
aftermath of the WWII. Like the Vatican, European Christian democrats envisaged 
European integration as a bulwark both against communism and against the threat 
posed by godless modern lifestyles. Their influence in European politics at the 
beginning of the 1950s was indeed outstanding. By that time the absolute majority of 
the MPs of the six founding members of the EEC were Christian democrats. They were 
also the largest single group in the assembly of the ECSC.  
During Jacques Delores’s tenure as head of the Commission (January 1985–December 
1994), the first tangible efforts were made to establish regular links between the 
European Commission and religious and humanist groups. This process culminated in 
the formal establishment of the “Sole for Europe” initiative in 1994 which provided 
funds for ecumenical or inter-religious seminars for the elaboration on the meaning of 
European integration (Focas, 2009). 
The 1968 revolt came to designate a turning point in the process of European 
integration. As Daniel Cohn-Bendit eloquently put it: “1968 was still a European 
movement. It had different motivations, but it happened in many places in Europe. 
And this anti-authoritarian rebellion gave rise to a new form of society all over Europe. 
Today we are on the path to a common identity” (Dülffer, 2008).  
European identity – the conundrum 
The current European identity stems from this axiological clash of values. On the one 
hand, the origins of European integration are of Christian provenance. On the other 
hand, since at least 1968, the gist of European integration has been increasingly 
characterised by individualism and the lack of a sense of traditional community (as 
defined by Christian democrats) fuelled by the ideologies of the 1968-revolt-based 
socialism and the early 1980s neoliberalism. In this regard, 2004 and the so-called Big 
Bang enlargement also “took their toll”. Apparently, as evidenced by the research 
carried out by Paul Copeland on negotiations surrounding the Working Time Directive 
and the Services Directive, new member states consistently joined the neoliberal 
coalition lead by the United Kingdom (Copeland, 2012). As he eloquently summarises: 
“European integration has long been viewed as featuring a clash of capitalisms with 
member states having a particular allegiance to either the liberal coalition or the 
regulated capitalism coalition. Divisions within the EU integration process can be 
located within a two-dimensional political space: the first dimension ranging from 
                                                        
6 As of revision of this paper (March 2018) Robert Schuman is considered a Servant of God. His beatification 






social democracy to market liberalism and the second from nationalism to 
supranationalism.”  
What do we make of contemporary Europe and the current European identity, if there 
is such a thing at all? Since the 1980s and the deregulation of the financial markets 
agenda, an observable trend has been for states to withdraw from their function and 
effectively outsource their capabilities to private for-profit companies. This trend has 
been referred to as “post-democracy” (Crouch, 2004). “The idea of post-democracy 
helps us describe situations when boredom, frustration and disappointment have 
settled in after a democratic moment; when powerful minority interests have become 
far more active than the mass of ordinary people in making the political system work 
for them; where political elites have learned to manage and manipulate popular 
demands; and where people have to be persuaded to vote by top-down publicity 
campaigns.”  
Similarly, Henry Giroux (2016) claims that neoliberalism as a mode of governance, 
produces identities, subjects and ways of life free of government regulations, driven by 
a survival of the fittest ethic, grounded in the idea of the free, possessive individual and 
committed to the right of ruling groups and institutions to accrue wealth removed from 
matters of ethics and social costs. As a policy and political project, neoliberalism is 
wedded to the privatisation of public services, the selling off of state functions, the 
deregulation of finance and labour, the elimination of the welfare state and unions, the 
liberalisation of trade in goods and capital investment and the marketisation and 
commodification of society.” 
This, arguably, has produces a sense of vagueness or even a lack of community. On the 
one hand, the left-wing parties seem to emphasise only some aspects of the European 
identity, such as tolerance and inclusiveness, and, on the other hand, neoliberalism 
mainly promotes consumerism instead of citizenship. As Matthew Goodwin (2015) 
accurately observes, clearly the liberals cannot present any coherent vision that would 
attract European societies en masse amid growing fears contrary to right-wing 
movements (often termed the “radical right” by the same liberals). 
John Gray, of the London School of Economics, goes even further. In his interesting 
writings on contemporary liberalism, he identifies precisely the logical loopholes and 
lack of moral consequence as displayed by proponents of liberalism: “Today’s liberals 
differ widely about how the wealth and opportunities of a market economy should be 
shared. What none of them question is the type of market globalisation that has 
developed over the past three decades. […] That has come to be seen as a liberal 
principle: the right of everyone to assert what they take to be their identity – 
particularly if it can be represented as that of an oppressed minority – by whatever 
means are judged necessary. If free speech stands in the way, the practice must be 
discarded. If terrorism is required, so be it.” (Gray, 2016). 
Gray identifies a new type of order which European societies seem to be entering out 
of the ideologically narrow framework of contemporary liberalism. He refers to it as: 
“a post-liberal order: […] A post-liberal society is one in which freedom and toleration 
are protected under the shelter of a strong state. In economic terms, this entails 
discarding the notion that the primary purpose of government is to advance 
globalisation. In future, governments will succeed or fail by how well they can deliver 
prosperity while managing the social disruption that globalisation produces.” 
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Against this background, it is hardly surprising that European citizens have little faith 
in their own political elites, either at the national or the European levels. The last 
elections to the European parliament, in May 2014, attracted a record low turnout 
slightly above 40Recent parliamentary elections in the Netherlands, as well as the 
presidential and parliamentary elections in France, show that so-called liberal 
candidates had to “borrow” rightist/national rhetoric or even practices to secure their 
victories.  
Conclusion 
The shift of the political paradigm in European politics has had numerous 
consequences relevant to the European integration processes. Firstly, the left-wing 
parties, because of their acceptance of the globalisation paradigm, have turned away 
from their traditional electorate. Consequently, the left should rather be referred to as 
the “post-left”.  
As the German example shows, Christian Democrats (CDU), ahead of the last elections, 
were willing to abandon traditional (Christian) values and officially recognise same-
sex marriage. By the same token, other so-called conservatives in the EU have either 
agreed or are debating a more liberal approach to the issue. Discussions on abortion, 
euthanasia and the abolition of the death penalty have long featured in many EU 
member states, and this development prompts the author of this paper to claim that 
the conservatives should in fact now be termed “post-conservatives”. 
As a consequence, the mainstream political spectrum seems indistinguishable for the 
common voter, who turns against the political establishment (in the case of Emmanuel 
Macron in France) both nationally and across the EU. This is evidenced by the latest 
study coordinated by Chatham House, according to which: “there is a divide between 
elites and the public. There is alignment between the two groups in their attitudes to, 
among other things, EU solidarity, EU democracy and a sense of European identity. 
However, the data also show an important divide in general attitudes, beliefs and life 
experiences. The elite are more likely to experience the benefits of EU integration and 
are more liberal and optimistic. Meanwhile, there is simmering discontent within the 
public, large sections of whom view the EU in negative terms, want to see it return 
some powers to member states, and feel anxious over the effects of immigration” 
(Chatham House, 2017). 
In other words, the left is not “leftist” enough, and the right is not “rightist” enough 
anymore. There seems to be an ideological emptiness, which affects the prospects of a 
European identity and with it integration of Europe. The reaction to such state of 
affairs seems to be rising populism and national sentiments. This is a sad state of 
affairs, where individuals can make fewer and fewer political choices, ones which in 
most cases are meaningless, and where the economic realities impose limitations upon 
whole generations rather than facilitate their development. As John Gray asserts: 
“Protecting liberty is not just a matter of curbing government, however. Rolling back 
the state in the economy and society can have the effect of leaving people less free – a 
fact that was recognised by liberal thinkers of an earlier generation” (Gray, 2016).  
Both Henry Giroux and Colin Crouch are fundamentally in agreement when they assert 
that the biggest winners from globalisation and the biggest threats to the social order 





force of everyday life, big government is disparaged as either incompetent or a threat 
to individual freedom, suggesting that power should reside in markets and 
corporations rather than in governments and citizens. Citizenship has increasingly 
become a function of market values, and politics has been restructured as ‘corporations 
have been increasingly freed from social control through deregulation, privatization, 
and the neoliberal measures’” (Giroux, 2008). 
Citizens in this regard simply become mostly consumers. The sense of their existence 
is reduced to ever-growing consumerism in order to satisfy the ever-growing demands 
and pressures of the economy. The monetisation and the marketization of their work, 
paralleled by growing competitiveness and automatisation/robotisation, are forcing 
whole sections of the societies of the so-called developed world to accept lower wages 
and less security (the “precariat”). Under such circumstances, the lending institutions 
of the financial world “come to the rescue”. The effect, more often than not, is what the 
author of this paper refers to as “slavumerism” – a peculiar combination of slavery 
(debt bondage) and consumerism. 
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